Recent changes legislated in the U.S. Social Security system are changing the economic incentives to work and retire. Some older workers will respond to these new incentives by retiring at different ages. This paper evaluates the signs and magnitudes of these responses. Using a representative sample of male workers, we investigate the pre-reform earnings, private pensions, and Social Security profiles available at alternative retirement ages. Then we examine four specific changes in the structure of Social Security benefits: raising the normal retirement age, delaying the cost-of-living adjustment, lowering early retirement benefits, and increasing late retirement payments. Behavioral parameters are estimated using an ordered logit model of retirement ages; these are than used to evaluate how retirement behavior might respond to each of the four reforms.
Introduction
In the last decade many countries have come to recognize that people are devoting ever-shorter portions of their lives to work despite living ever longer. Lengthening retirement periods imply growing financial pressure on both yrivate sector and governmental pensions, giving rise to heated policy debate over what is to be done. The United States Congress recently moved beyond debate by legislating a series of changes in Social Security, the U.S. government-sponsored pension program. This paper presents an economic analysis of such reforms. In so doing, we also provide an overview of the determinants of retirement ages and retirement incomes, which should prove useful to economic analysts interested in evaluating other pension reform proposals in different contexts.
The estimates presented below incorporate complex budget sets and preferences which have been observed in previous retirement studies. Governmental and private pension schemes are highly complex; see, for instance, Mitchell and Fields (1984b) for the United States, and Zabaiza et al. (1980) for Great
Britain. Sections I and II of the present paper detail the form and structure of retirement income options confronting older workers before and after the reforms of interest.
Regarding preferences, earlier research on retirement has shown that workers are heterogeneous (Mitchell and Fields, l984a; Gustman and Steinmeier, l983a) . Same are work-lovers and some leisure-lovers. Our estimation method, ordered logit, allows for correlation of preferences across retirement ages for the same worker. The estimated parameters are presented in Section III.
The core results appear in Sections IV and V, predicting changes in retirement ages and retirement incomes respectively. Of the specific reforms examined, we find that lowering early retirement benefits has the largest impact on retirement ages, while delaying cost of living adjustments or raising late retirement credits have little effect. Increasing the normal retirement age has an intermediate impact. Retirement incomes are affected most by increasing the normal retirement age, next most by lowering early retirement benefits, and least by delaying cost of living adjustments or raising late retirement credits.
The model is partial equilibrium in spirit, examining changes in Social Security holding constant pension and wage structures.
Conclusions appear in Section VI.
I. Retirement Incentives Prior To The Reforms
In order to understand how Social Security reforms will affect retirement incomes and retirement behavior, it is first necessary to construct the intertemporal budget set facing older workers prior to the reforms. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available data which can be used to determine income streams or retirement patterns for the current cohort of older workers.
Instead, we draw on an earlier data file of workers known as the Longitudinal Retirement History survey (LRIfS) and update this file to reflect the positions of workers currently reaching retirement age. pension; this allowed us to proxy benefit amounts for retirement at age 65 using industry-level benefits reported by Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) . For retirement at other ages, benefit amounts were adjusted using quasi-actuarial factors reported by Schulz and Leavitt (reported in Burkhauser and Quinn, 1980) .
To estimate the effects of Social Security reforms in the 1980s, the LRHS data must be brought up to date. This is accomplished in three simple steps.
(1) Earnings: Pre-tax earnings are adjusted upward by assuming that older workers' wage profiles grew at the same pace as did the average worker's wage between the l970s and 1982. Post-tax earnings for the synthetic cohort are computed using federal income tax formulas and Social Security payroll taxes in effect in l982. (2) Although retirement plans may change in reaction to such an unexpected event, these changes have not been incorporated in the development of the intertemporal budget set. To analyze them in a more comprehensive framework would require stochastic dynamic programming, a task beyond the scope of the current literature and the present paper.
The components of the 1982 budget set thus devised appear in the top panel of 'Totals may differ from column sums due to rounding.
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The individual-level data underlying Table 1 are used in three ways in what follows. First, they are used as a standard against which several Social Security reforms may be compared. Second, they are used to derive predicted retirement ages using behavioral estimates. Last, they are employed to predict changes in income streams and retirement ages under the various reforms. We take these up in turn.
II. Retirement Incentives In Four Reform Scenarios
Four specific reforms are simulated in this paper: Increasing the normal retirement age, delaying the cost-of-living adjustment, raising the late retirement credit, and changing the early retirement reduction factor.6 In order to evaluate how each alters retirement incentives, a bit of explanation is needed on how Social Security benefits in the United States are determined.
A first step in computing benefits is to find each worker's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). The AIME is found by: indexing earnings up to the Social Security taxable maximum in each year between 1951 and age 60; comparing these to nominal earnings, if any, after that age; selecting the highest (for example, a worker turning age 60 in 1982 would have his highest 28 years of earnings included); converting to a monthly basis; and averaging.
The second step in calculating Social Security benefits is to determine the worker's Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). In 1982, PIA was determined from AIME according to the following formula:
9O of AIME up to "BEND POINT 1" plus 32% of AIME between "BEND POINT 1" and "BEND POINT 2" plus 15% of AIME above "BEND POINT 2." 8 In real 1982 dollars, "BEND POINT 1" -$230 and "BEND POINT 2" $1388, both in monthly terms; in future years, the bend points will increase with the Consumer Price Index (thus remaining the same in real terms).
The third step is to compute the worker's Social Security benefit as a multiple of the PIA:
Worker's benefit PIA * multiple.
This multiple equals 1.00 if the worker is age 65 when he begins to collect benefits; this is the "age of retirement" from the point of the view of the Security benefits of the illustrative LRHS worker described above, while Table 3 reports their effects on total income (PDVY). In these computations the earnings and private pension elements of the underlying budget set are assumed to be unaffected by the simulated changes in Social Security structures. Hence, the estimated impacts of the various reforms on retirement ages should be thought of as partial equilibrium estimates, leaving aside possible responses of pension plans and e2rnings profiles to changes in Social Security.
Increasing the normal retirement age to 68 (Experiment A) lowers retirement benefits substantially as compared to the pre-reform scenario. Annual payments fall by $1,000 or more regardless of when the worker retires. This translates into PDVY streams which are lower by about $17,000 for people retiring in their early 60s; the reduction is only somewhat smaller for workers deferring retirement until age 65. Another effect of Experiment A is to tilt the Social Security benefit structure. The system becomes actuarially more advantageous until age 65, such that delaying retirement from age 62 to age 65 actually increases the present value of benefits by some $4,000. The experimental benefit structure is also roughly neutral after age 65, in stark contrast to the pre-reform penalty.
In overview, then, increasing the normal retirement age as outlined here lower8 benefits at any given retirement age and provides new financial incentives to remain on the job longer. Since the income amounts involved are small, this reform does not appreciably alter the pattern of discounted benefit gains obtained by deferring retirement.
Experiment C raises the late retirement credit to match the early retirement reduction factor. Benefits are increased after age 65, raising annual benefits by as much as $800 at age 68. Present value at age 68 increases by $6,000---still not enough to achieve actuarial neutrality, but substantially reducing the penalty (in PDV terms) for continuing to work beyond age 65.
Experiment D would have lowered early Social Security benefits, holding benefits beyond age 65 the same. For a worker retiring at age 62 or before, the annual benefit would have fallen by $1,700 and present discounted value by some $21,000. The gain in present discounted value of Social Security benefits for an extra year o work before age 65 would have been $6,000-9,000. This reform would have created a powerful penalty for retiring early and a powerful incentive for continued work. Yet, as we shall see, even those forces would not change retirement ages very much.
III. Preferences for Income and Leisure
The next step is to evaluate how workers would be likely to respond to the changes brought by Social Security reforms such as those described above. To do this, it is necessary to obtain behavioral parameters indicating how older individuals weigh income and leisure. An econometric approach that proved fruitful in our earlier study (Mitchell and Fields, 1984a) is to model retirement in a discrete choice framework. Following McFadden (1974) , we posit that the utility of the ith worker if he retired at age j is:
The term in square brackets is the "strict utility" component for the average person, varying of course with values of income and leisure at different ages.
The disturbance term eij is independent across people; this assumption is quite conventional in labor supply models. In other contexts, it is also conventional to require ejj to be uncorrelated across different choice alternatives for a given person, as for instance would be the case if the discret choice model were estimated using a logit technology. However, in the retirinent setting, there is strong reason to believe that correlation between unobserved tastes for nearby retirement ages may be important--particularly if individuals are "workaholics" or "leisure lovers".
Allowing for this sort of correlation is feasible within a conditional ordered logit (OL) setup, where the probability of choosing one specific retirement age is allowed to depend on the attractiveness of immediately adjacent retirement ages.8 Using that model we obtain estimates of a and which are significantly nonzero by conventional levels, and of the anticipated signs: both income and leisure are shown to be important determinants increasing older workers' utility. In relative terms, the estimated coefficients (a/B-1.4/2.3 -.61) suggest that a percentage increase in leisure would be weighed relatively more heavily than the same percentage increase in income.
We note in passing that the ordered logit model proves to be sensible on statistical grounds, since the data reject the hypothesis that the disturbance terms are uncorrelated across individuals.9 Thus all policy evaluations reported below utilize the theoretically and statistically preferable coefficients from the ordered logit model.
IV. Effects of Social Security Reforms on Retirement Ages
Predicting the effects of the Social Security reforms on retirement ages requires three steps. First the OL coefficients are used to predict each sample individual's probability of selecting all available retirement ages, under the pre-reform budget set. Next we predict retirement ages under all four experimental budget sets. Finally we average over individuals. Thus the results appearing in the first column of Table 4 refer to averages over the sample as a whole, not just to the illustrative worker described above.
We find that the estimated retirement age responses vary depending on the experiment performed: since barly retirement benefits are unaffected and most workers retire prior to age 65. Each of these reforms would be predicted to delay retirement by less than a week, on average.
Overall, the four policies simulated here generate only very small changes in retirement behavior---changes in lifetime income of as much as twenty to thirty percent at some ages would result in at most a three month deferral.1°O ur findings are generically similar to those generated from other empirical models of older workers' labor supply. Burtless and Moffitt's (1982) Finally, estimate the effects of raising the normal retirement age for Social Security benefits from 65 to 67. This reduces early benefits by 10 to 13 1/3 percentage points in each year. They estimate that the two year increase in the normal retirement age would increase actual retirement by about two months; this is somewhat larger than our prediction that a three-year increase in the normal retirement age would increase actual retirement by about 1.6 months, but both are very small. Likewise, they find as we do that the cost-of-living adjustment deferral is expected to raise actual retirement by less than one month.
In sum; the numbers that emerge from our study are very close to others estimates. We all find very small elasticities of retirement age with respect to changes in Social Security benefits: on the order of 0.1 or less. All of these behavioral estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than actuarial assumptions made by functionaries of the Social Security system. Schieber (1982) is particularly clear on the assumptions made by Social Security actuaries. Regarding the reform in which the normal retirement age is raised from 65 to 68 he says: "The average age at retirement for men is assumed to rise to 65.6 years at the end of the transition, which contrasts with an average retirement age of 63.2 years at the beginning of the simulation." p. 190
[Emphasis added.] Thus, the Social Security actuaries were assuming a 2.3 year response to a three year increase in the normal retirement age. Our behavioral evidence suggests that this assumption is unwarranted and that the probable response is no more than a tenth of that.
The small retirement age responses predicted from behavioral models have implications for the financial viability of the Social Security system and of workers. First, looking at the Social Security system, the average worker is predicted to make only a marginal change in respo.ise to a downward shift in benefit formulas. This means that the Social Security system will have to pay out less to the worker over his lifetime. Furthermore, during the weeks or months of extra work, the system gains additional revenues. The system therefore comes out ahead from these reforms.
Does the financial gain to the Social Security system necessarily imply a corresponding financial loss to Social Security recipients? Not necessarily, if workers respond as the actuaries assume and extend their worklives by enough to retain their old benefit levels. However, the behavioral evidence from several models including ours suggests otherwise. Older workers will not give up much leisure. Consequently, the models predict that workers will be rendered poorer.
We turn now to estimates of the changes in incomes of retirees.
V. Effects of Social Security Reforms on Retirement Incomes For the experiment which lowers early retirement benefits while keeping normal benefits the same (Experiment C) the percentage reduction in PDVY is less after allowing for retirement age endogeneity than when retirement ages are held constant. This experiment increases the tilt in the benefit structure as well as reducing Social Security benefits at any given age. The consequent labor supply response would offset about half of the lifetime income reduction that would otherwise take place.
In the other experiments, retirement ages do not change appreciably 80 that the effects on PDVSS and PDVY are the same when the retirement age is allowed to vary as when it is taken as exogenously determined.
VI. Conclusions
This paper evaluated the likely responses of older workers to four reforms in the Social Security benefit formulas: 'increasing the normal retirement age, delaying the cost-of-living adjustment, raising the late retirement credit, and changing the early retirement reduction factor. We first developed workers'
intertemporal budget sets prior to and after the reforms. Next, we evaluated how retirement behavior might respond to these new economic incentives.
Finally, new retirement ages and retirement incomes were compared with prereform levels. Clearly this approach is readily adaptable to other reform proposals and even other retirement income systems.
For the particular reforms examined here, the largest response is observed for the experiment which cuts benefits at the earliest ages, while offering larger rewards to continued work. The likely response for this change would be about a three month delay in the average retirement age. An intermediate change, of about one and a half months, was predicted in response to increasing the normal retirement age. Very small responses, of less than one week, were obtained for delays in the cost-of-living adjustment or raising the late retirement credit, both of which altered income incentives the least.
Responses of these magnitudes will be too small to compensate retirees for reductions in benefit formulas. Thus, smaller Social Security benefits will be paid to workers. The cut is largest for increases in the normal retirement age, next largest for decreases in early retirement benefits. The Social Security system's financial burden will be eased, but retirees' incomes will fall on average.
7. This form for the utility function is consistent with evidence indicating that the substitution elasticity for older workers is very close to -1; see . 8. This model, due to Small (1982) , is described in more detail in Mitchell and Fields (l984a) . Essentially the probability of selecting retirement age j from among several ordered alternatives is described as: where Nk -l/2[in (1/2) + in (1 + + in (1 + and P° the probability of selecting retirement age k in a conventional inuitinomial iogit model. As is always the case in logit models, the coefficients are identified up to a factor of proportionality only (e.g. the utility of alternative states relative to one particular state used as the standard of comparison).
9. Both the Small (1981) test and the Hausman-NcFadden test (1981) described in Mitchell and Fields (1984a) reject the hypothesis that the ordered logit coefficients are identical to those that would be obtained using an ordinary multinomial logit model.
Simulations using coefficients from a conventional niultinomial logit (MNL)
model were also evaluated for three of the four experiments. The two sets of results differed by less than one month in all cases: Experiment A, +1.6 months in OL versus +2.0 in MNL; Experiment C, +0.2 months in OL versus +0.3 months in MNL; Experiment D, +2.9 months in OL versus +3.6 months in MNL.
